Abstract. Unsafe memory accesses in programs written using popular programming languages like C and C++ have been among the leading causes of software vulnerability. Memory safety checkers, such as Softbound, enforce memory spatial safety by checking if accesses to array elements are within the corresponding array bounds. However, such checks often result in high execution time overhead due to the cost of executing the instructions associated with the bound checks. To mitigate this problem, techniques to eliminate redundant bound checks are needed. In this paper, we propose a novel framework, SIMBER, to eliminate redundant memory bound checks via statistical inference. In contrast to the existing techniques that primarily rely on static code analysis, our solution leverages a simple, model-based inference to identify redundant bound checks based on runtime statistics from past program executions. We construct a knowledge base containing sufficient conditions using variables inside functions, which are then applied adaptively to avoid future redundant checks at a function-level granularity. Our experimental results on realworld applications show that SIMBER achieves zero false positives. Also, our approach reduces the performance overhead by up to 86.94% over Softbound, and incurs a modest 1.7% code size increase on average to circumvent the redundant bound checks inserted by Softbound.
Introduction
Many software bugs and vulnerabilities in applications (that are especially written using C/C++) occur due to unsafe pointer usage and out-of-bound array accesses. Security exploits, that take advantage of buffer overflows or illegal memory reads/writes, have been a major concern over the past decade. Some of the recent examples include: (i) In February 2016, a Google engineer discovered a stack overflow bug in the glibc DNS client side resolver inside getaddrinfo() function that had the potential to be exploited through attacker-controller domain names, attacker-controlled DNS servers or man-in-the-middle attack [10] ; (ii) In 2016, Cisco released security patches to fix a buffer overflow vulnerability in the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) version 1 (v1) and IKE version 2 (v2) code of Cisco ASA Software that could allow an attacker to cause a reload of the affected system or to remotely execute code [5] .
In order to protect software from spatial memory/array bound violations, tools such as Softbound [12] have been developed that maintains metadata such as array boundaries along with rules for metadata propagation when loading or storing pointer values. By doing so, Softbound makes sure that pointer accesses do not violate boundaries through runtime checks. While such a tool offers protection from spatial safety violations in programs, we should also note that they often incur high performance overheads due to the following reasons. (a) Array bound checking incurs extra instructions in the form of memory loads and stores for pointer metadata and the propagation of metadata between pointers during assignments. (b) In pointer-intensive programs, such additional memory accesses can introduce memory bandwidth bottleneck, and further degrade system performance.
To mitigate runtime overheads, static techniques to remove redundant checks have been proposed, e.g., ABCD [3] builds and solves systems of linear inequalities among bound and index variables, and WPBound [14] statically computes the potential range of target pointer values inside loops to avoid Softboundrelated checks. As the relationship among pointer-affecting variables (i.e., variables, whose values can influence pointers) and array bounds become more complex, static analysis is less effective and usually cannot remove a high percentage of redundant array bound checks.
In this paper, we propose SIMBER, a novel approach that verifies conditions for eliminating bound checks on the fly by harnessing runtime information instead of having to rely on discovering redundant checks solely during compiletime or using static code analysis. SIMBER is effective in removing a vast majority of redundant array checks while being simple and elegant. The key idea is to infer the safety of a pointer dereference based on statistics from prior program executions. If prior executions show that the access of array A with length L at index i is within bound, then it is safe to remove the checks on any future access of A with length no smaller than L and an index no larger than i.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
1. Instead of solely relying on static code analysis, SIMBER utilizes runtime statistics to check whether array bound checks can be eliminated. Our experimental results show that SIMBER can discover a high number of redundant bound checks through analyzing the variables that can affect the pointer values. 2. We determine a bound check as redundant only if previous executions deem the checks to be unnecessary and current execution satisfy the condition derived from such prior execution history. This helps SIMBER to guarantee zero false positives. 3. We evaluate using applications from SPEC2006 benchmark suite [1] that have the highest performance overheads in Softbound: bzip2, lbm, sphinx3 and hmmer. In these experiments, we observe that our approach reduces the performance overheads of spatial safety checks by over 86.94% compared to Softbound.
Background
Softbound stores the pointer metadata (array base and bound) when pointers are initialized, and performs array bound checks (or validation) when pointers are dereferenced. For example, for an integer pointer ptr to an integer array intArray [100] , Softbound stores ptr base = & intArray [0] and ptr bound = ptr base + size(intArray). When dereferencing pointers, Softbound obtains the base and bound information associated with the target pointer ptr, and does the following check: if the value of ptr is less than ptr base, or, if ptr+size is larger than ptr bound, the program terminates. A disadvantage with this approach is the high runtime performance overheads associated with metadata tracking and bound checks especially on pointers that are largely benign or safe. Figure 1 shows the runtime overhead incurred by Softbound-instrumented applications over un-instrumented application as baseline in SPEC2006 benchmarks [1] .
Fig. 1. Runtime performance overhead incurred by Softbound
We note that some prior works [3, 14] have proposed static analysis techniques to eliminate redundant bound checks. In SIM-BER, we propose a novel framework where the redundant bound check elimination is performed with the guidance of runtime statistics. Our results show that even limited amounts of runtime statistics can be a quite powerful tool to infer the safety of pointer dereferences, and eliminate unnecessary pointer bound checks.
Consider the example shown in Fig. 2 , where foo(dest, src, n) copies the first n characters in string src to dest, and replaces remaining characters with blocks of 4-character pattern '0000'. To guarantee safe pointer usage, Softbound checks (denoted by CHECK SB) will be added before each pointer dereference, e.g., in lines 8, 9, and 20. Thus, bound checks are performed for each iteration of the for and while loops, resulting in high execution time (performance) overhead.
A static approach such as ABCD [3] relies on building constraint systems for target pointers and programs to remove redundant bound checks. In particular, it identifies that indices i and j in foo() must satisfy i ≤ j from the conditions in line 18. Therefore, bound checks on * (dest+i) in line 8 is deemed redundant given the checks performed on * (dest + j) in line 20. However, such static approaches cannot be effective in eliminating other bound checks where such static inferences cannot be made (e.g., in lines 9 and 20). Further, bound information for both pointers dest and src needs to be kept and propagated inside foo() at runtime.
In this paper, we show that (conditionally) removing all the bound checks in foo() is indeed possible using SIMBER. Our solution stems from two key observations. First, redundant bound checks can be effectively identified by examining different runs of foo(). Consider pointer dereference * (src + i) in line 10 as an example. Let i (k) and src bound (k) denote the value of index i and the bound of array src in the kth run, which is already determined to be bound-safe, i.e., i (k) ≤ src bound (k) . It is easy to see that any future runs of foo() satisfying i ≤ i (k) and src bound ≥ src bound (k) will also be bound-safe, due to the following chain of inequalities i ≤ i (k) ≤ src bound (k) ≤ src bound, implying i ≤ src bound. Second, through a simple dependency analysis, we find that the value of index i is only positively affected by input variable n. Due to this positive dependency, the redundant-check condition i ≤ i (k) is guaranteed if we have n ≤ n (k) . Thus, bound checks for * (src + i) in line 9 can be determined as redundant by comparing input variables n and src bound with that of previous runs, which entirely removes all checks and bound propagation in foo() at function-level.
Overview of System Design
SIMBER consists of five modules: Dependency Graph, Statistical-guided Inference, Knowledge Base, Redundant checks removal and Check-HotSpot Identification. Figure 3 presents our system diagram. Given a target pointer, SIMBER aims to determine if the pointer dereference needs to be checked. First, SIMBER collects values of pointer-affecting variables which can affect the target pointer. It constructs multi-dimensional safe regions where the values of such pointeraffecting variables do not result in bad program behavior (e.g., program crash, buffer overflow). In the current program execution, if the data point representing pointer-affecting variables is inside the safe region, then this pointer dereference is determined to be safe.
Dependency Graph Construction
Dependency Graph (DG) is a bi-directed graph G = (V, E) that represents program variables as vertices in V, and models the dependency between the variables and array indices/bounds through edges in E. We construct a DG for each function by including all if its pointers and the pointer-affecting variables that could affect the value of pointer. We add trip count (number of times a branch is taken) as auxiliary variables to assist the analysis of loops.
Definition 1 (DG-Node). The nodes in dependency graphs are the variables that can affect the pointers such as (a) the variables that determine the base of pointers through pointer initialization, assignment or casting; (b) variables that affect the offset and bound of pointers like array index, pointer increment and variables affecting memory allocation size; (c) Trip Count (TC): the number of times a branch (in which a target pointer value changes) is taken.

Definition 2 (DG-Edge). DG-Node v 1 will have an out-edge to DG-Node v
Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) is commonly used by compilers to represent the structure of program code, and to analyze the dependencies between variables and statements. We use Joern tool [18] to generate AST for each function.
Algorithm 1. Dependency graph construction for a given function foo()
for each pair of variables j, k in s do 8:
add edge e(j, k) to E according to Remark 1 9: Output: Dependency-Graph G = (V, E) Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode of Dependency Graph (DG) construction for a given function, foo(). First, we obtain all of the pointers and their corresponding pointer-affecting variables, and represent them as DG-Nodes. Second, we traverse dependency graph and identify adjacent DG-Nodes that represent the pointer-affecting variables associated with each target pointer. Each target pointer will have an entry in the form of (func : ptr, var 1 
Statistical-Guided Inference
This module builds safe regions based on the pointer-affecting variables identified by DGs, and updates the safe region through statistical inference from previous execution. Once the pointer-affecting variables for the target pointer are determined, SIMBER collects the values of pointer-affecting variables from runtime profile, and produces a data point (or a vector) in Euclidean space with the coordinates of data point being the actual values of pointer-affecting variables. The dimension of the Euclidean space is the number of pointer-affecting variables for the target pointer. The inference about pointer safety (for pointer-affecting variables that are positively-correlated with the array bound) can be derived as follows: Let us say that a data point p = (vp 1 , vp 2 , . . . , vp d ) from prior execution is checked and deemed as safe. Consider another data point q = (vq 1 , vq 2 , . . . , vq d ) for the same target pointer from current execution. If each element of q is no larger than that of p, i.e., vq 1 
, then the bound checks on the target pointer can be removed in the current execution. To extend this inference to pointer-affecting variables that are negatively-correlated with array bound, we unify the representation by converting the variable bound into C − bound for sufficiently large constant C (such as the maximum value of an unsigned 32-bit integer). Thus C − bound is also positively correlated, and C − bound q ≤ C − bound p implies bound q ≥ bound p . There are data points that cannot be determined as safe based on existing (current) safe region when q / ∈ SR(S). In this case, SIMBER performs bound checks to determine memory safety of such data points and adaptively updates the safe region based on the outcome. More precisely, given current safe region SR(S) and the new coming data point q / ∈ SR(S), SR(S) will expand to SR(S) by:
Definition 3 (False Positive). A false positive occurs if a bound check, that is identified as redundant, is indeed necessary and should have not been removed.
Definition 4 (Safe Region (SR)). Safe region is an area that is inferred and
where {x : x ≤ q} is the set of safe points dominated by vector q. It expands the safe region if (i) there are pointer-affecting variables in the new input q that have a larger value than all points in current safe region SR(S), or (ii) there are array lengths or negatively-correlated variables that have smaller values than all points in SR(S), allowing higher degree of redundant bound check elimination in future executions.
Knowledge Base
SIMBER stores the safe regions for target pointers in a disjoint memory space -Knowledge Base. The data in Knowledge Base, in the format of (key, value), represents the position and the sufficient conditions for removing the redundant bound checks for each target pointer. Statistical Inference is triggered to compute the Safe Region whenever the Knowledge Base is updated with newer data points and new execution logs.
We use SQLite [2] to store our Knowledge Base. We create a table to store conditions derived from pointer values and the corresponding pointer-affecting variables.
Redundant Checks Identification
SIMBER instruments functions within the program with a call to SIMBER(),
that collects pointer-affecting input parameters inside a target function, and queries the knowledge base to obtain the conditions for eliminating array bound checks. In particular, if the all of the data points (formed using function parameters) are within the safe region, the propagation of bound information and the array bound checks can be safely removed from this target function entirely.
We maintain two versions of Check-Hotspot functions: the original version (which contains no bound checks) and the Softbound-instrumented version (that has bound checks and bound meta-data propagation). Based on the result of SIMBER() outcome, we can either skip all bound checks inside the function (if the condition holds) or proceed to call the Softbound-instrumented function (if the condition is not satisfied) where bound checks would be performed as shown in Fig. 2 . The instrumentation of SIMBER() condition verification inside functions leads to a small increase in code size (by about 1.7%), and we note that such extra code is added only to a small subset of functions with highest runtime overhead for Softbound (see Sect. 3.5 for details).
Check-HotSpot Identification
To minimize the effect of runtime bound checks, we choose Check-Hotspots functions that have high levels of pointer activity. We identify Check-HotSpots as follows: (a) We use Perf profiling tool [6] to profile two versions of programs: noninstrumented version and softbound-instrumented source code. (b) We compute the difference in absolute execution time spent on different functions between non-instrumented source programs and softbound-instrumented programs to capture the extra time spent on softbound-related code. For every function, we calculate the function-level overhead as the ratio of the time spent on softboundrelated code to the total execution time spent in the original version. (c) We list all of the functions with function-level overhead of at least 5% as the CheckHotSpots. 
SIMBER-Optimized Softbound Code
SIMBER instruments the program by adding two branches as shown in Fig. 4 . Function SIMBER() verifies whether the input variables of foo() satisfy the condition to eliminate array bound check, and chooses one of the two possible branches accordingly. Recall the Softbound-instrumented foo() function in Fig. 2 . The dependency graph contains edges from n to i (due to the for loop in line 6), from src len to len (due to the assignment in line 14), from len to i (due to the while loop in line 16), from i to j (due to the second for loop in line 18), and from i, j to pointers src and dest (due to pointer dereference in lines 10 and 21).
We focus on bound checks for * (dest + j) in line 20 to illustrate SIMBER. From the dependency graph, we find bound-affecting variables len and n, and form a 3-dimensional vector (len, n, C − dest bound) (for large enough, constant C) to represent the safe region corresponding to bound checks for * (dest + j). Assume that C is 1024 and that three previous data points are available: P 1 = (200, 160, 1024−256), P 2 = (180, 120, 1024−256) and P 3 = (150, 140, 1024−512), respectively. Per our discussion in Sect. 3.2, a safe region can be derived from the three data point vectors in a R 3 space, i.e., SR = {x : x ≤ P i , ∀i = 1, 2, 3}, where inequality x ≤ P i between two vectors is component-wise.
In future executions, new input variables y = (len, n, C − dest bound) are verified by SIM BER() to determine if vector x is inside this safe region, i.e., y ∈ SR. As long as we can find one vector from P 1 , P 2 and P 3 that dominates y, then the memory access of * (dest + j) in line 20 is safe, allowing us to remove all bound checks and propagation.
Evaluation
We use Softbound as the baseline to evaluate the effectiveness of SIMBER in removing redundant bound checks. All measurements are made on a 2.54 GHz Intel Xeon(R) CPU E5540 8-core server with 12 GByte of main memory. The operating system is ubuntu 14.04 LTS.
We select several applications from SPEC 2006 benchmark suite [1] with high performance overheads, including bzip2, hmmer from SPECint and lbm, sphinx3 from SPECfp. In the evaluation, we first instrument the applications using Softbound, and use Perf [6] to identify the Check-HotSpot functions. Similar to ABCD [3] , we consider the optimization of upper-and lower-bound checks as two separate problems. In the following, we focus on eliminating redundant upperbound checks, and we note that this approach can be adapted to the dual problem of lower-bound checks. We use reference inputs provided with SPEC benchmarks. For applications that do not provide developer-supplied representative test cases, we note that fuzzing techniques [11, 16] can be used to generate test cases. The policies considered in our evaluation are (a) Softbound-instrumented version (denoted as Softbound). (b) SIMBER-Optimized Softbound (denoted as S.O.S), where redundant bounds check are removed.
Based on our Check-HotSpot identification results, we study 8 functions shown in Table 1 . We note that some Check-HotSpot functions may contribute to high runtime overhead mainly because they are executed frequently, e.g., bzip2::mainGtU is called more than 8 million times, despite having small code footprint.
Redundant Checks
To illustrate SIMBER's efficiency in eliminating redundant bounds checks, Table 1 shows the number of array bound checks required by Softbound, and the number of redundant checks removed by SIMBER along with rate of false positives reported under S.O.S. Our results show that Softbound-related checks can be completely eliminated by S.O.S in three out of eight cases. Table 2 shows the execution time incurred by Check-Hotspot functions in Softbound and S.O.S. Our experiments show that upto 86.94% improvement in execution time overhead can be achieved by S.O.S through eliminating redundant array bound checks inserted by Softbound. In a few functions, despite totally eliminating Softbound-instrumented array bound checks, a small runtime overhead is still incurred due to the extra code added by SIMBER to circumvent redundant bound checks at the function-level.
Memory Overhead and Code Increase
We note that SIMBER's memory overhead for storing Knowledge Base and additional code instrumentation are modest. Our experiments show that the worst memory overhead is only 20 KB, and the maximum code size increase is less than 5%. Across all applications, SIMBER has an average 5.28 KB memory overhead with an average 1.7% code increase. Overall, we reduce memory overhead by roughly 50% compared to that of Softbound. As a second example in bzip2::generateMTFValue, we study the conditions to remove bound checks on five different target pointers inside of the function. We observed that three out of five target pointers, with constant array length, are relatively safe from out-of-bound accesses that may also be handled through static (pre-runtime) methods. The array bounds for the other two target pointers are not constant, and eliminating redundant checks on these pointer require a more careful consideration of runtime statistics and conditions formed using pointer-affecting variables. We note that bzip2::BZ2 decompress also has similar behavior.
hmmer. hmmer is a program for searching DNA gene sequences, and involves many double pointer operations. There is only one Check-HotSpot function, P7Viterbi, which contributes over 98% of the performance overhead.
Inside of the hmmer::P7Viterbi function, there are four double pointers: xmx, mmx, imx and dmx. To cope with double pointers in this function, we consider the row and column array bounds separately, and construct safe regions for each dimension. Besides the four double pointers, we also identify conditions for identifying redundant bound checks for another 14 one-dimensional arrays and pointers. In this case, SIMBER is able to eliminate most of the redundant checks for these 14 one-dimensional arrays with relatively simple conditions for bound check removal. However, for the four double pointers, SIMBER is slightly more conservative due to higher number of dimensions in the conditions. lbm. lbm is developed to simulate incompressible fluids in 3D, and has only one Check-HotSpot function: lbm::LBM performStreamCollide. The function has two pointers (as input variables) with pointer assignments and dereferencing inside of a for loop. Using SIMBER, we obtain the bound conditions for each pointer dereferencing. Using runtime profile, we observed that the pointer dereferences to the same set of memory addresses repeatedly, providing an opportunity to remove all of the bound checks after successfully verifying bound conditions in the first iteration.
sphinx3. Sphinx3 is a well-known speech recognition system. For the first Check-HotSpot function sphinx3::vector gautbl eval logs3, there are four target pointers inside this function. Due to the identical access pattern, once we derive the bound check removal conditions for one single pointer, it can also be used for all others, allowing for the redundant checks to be eliminated simultaneously in this function. We observed a similar behavior for a second Check-HotSpot function sphinx3::mgau eval.
The last function sphinx3::subvq mgau shortlist also has four target pointers. For this function, SIMBER only removed 18.1% redundant checks. On further investigation, we found that a pointer, named vqdist, inside of this function had indirect memory access with its index value derived from another pointer: map. To handle such situations, we note that our DGs can be extended to include dependencies resulting from such indirect pointer references. Since we do not handle indirect memory accesses in the current version, we are unable to eliminate any redundant bound check that Softbound may perform for this pointer.
Related Work
Static code analysis and tools has been widely studied for discovering program vulnerabilities and bugs [8, 20] . Nurit et al. [7] have studied techniques that target string-related bugs in C programs with conservative pointer analysis using abstract constraint expressions for pointer operations. Such static approaches require extensive program modeling and analysis (e.g., by constructing constraint solver systems) and may offer limited scope in dealing with certain vulnerabilities that occur only at runtime (e.g., due to user input-related bugs). Wurthinger et al. [17] use dominator tree to maintain the conditions for code blocks in Javabased programs. CCured [13] is a type-safe system that classifies pointers to three types: safe, sequence, dynamic, and then applies different rules to check them. Different from these prior works, SIMBER leverages runtime profile to determine safe pointer accesses.
Statsym [9] proposes a novel framework to combine statistical and formal methods to discover for vulnerable paths in program, and can dramatically reduce the search space for vulnerable paths compared to symbolic executors such as KLEE [4] . Additionally, some works employ machine learning to improve the efficiency of static code analysis, and use the similarity of code patterns to facilitate discovery of bugs and errors [19, 20] . We note that the accuracy of such methods rely on the choice of machine learning algorithms. Hardware support to identify malicious information outflows [15] and code reuse-based attacks [21] through buffer overflows have also been studied by prior works. SIMBER can work synergistically with these approaches to improve the security of applications.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we propose SIMBER, a framework integrating with statisticsguided inference to remove redundant array bound checks based on runtime profile. Its statistical inference adaptively builds a knowledge base using program execution logs containing variables that affect pointer values, and then uses this information to remove redundant array bound checks inserted by popular array bound checkers such as Softbound. SIMBER reduces performance overhead of Softbound by up to 86.94%, and incurs a modest 1.7% code size increase on average to circumvent redundant bound checks inserted by Softbound. Currently, SIMBER works at function-level granularity. For future work, we will study ways to deploy SIMBER at a finer granularity to remove redundant bound checks.
